By Merlion
October 15 2015
I will attempt to summarise all the Financial Reports from 1997 to 2014 into simple tables to demonstrate how much we owe to Arsene Wenger who gives us a £390-million 60,000-seater Emirates Stadium and yet able to qualify for the Champions League for 18 successive seasons (or we could owe the fans who have been bled dry. Ed)
Arsene Wenger was well ahead of his time in “self-sustainable development” as his astute “player trading” business help substantially to tidy Arsenal over during the financially challenging Emirates Stadium construction period. None better illustrated that our player sales to FC Barcelona alone which may have contributed as much as one-third of £390-million 60,000-seater Emirates Stadium construction costs.
Data is available from www.arsenal.com, but only for 2004/05 to 2013/14 Arsenal Holdings Annual Report. Data for Table 1 from FY1997 to FY2004 are obtained from http://abehnisch.com/arsenal-profit-since-1996/. Other data were also obtained from Deloitte Money League.
Table 1 below shows during Arsene Wenger Era from FY1997 to FY2014, Arsenal Holdings had accumulative pre-tax profit amount to £297-million, a remarkable 9.6% on turnover and yet managed to control cost by keeping “Wage Bill” to less than 50% of turnover. Of course, those pre-tax profits include property development.
[b]Table 1: Arsenal Holdings Financial Report – FOOTBALL Group Turnover in £000’s
Arsene Wenger Era – 1996/97 to Present [/b]
… … … … … Turnover … ... Pre-Tax Profit … ... … Wage Bill
… … … … … … … …. … … … … .... % of ….. … … … … … ….. % of
[u]… … … … … £'000 … ... ..... £'000 … Turnover … ... £'000 ... ….. Turnover [/u]
FY1997: …… 27,158 … ….. 1,221 … ….. 4.5% … … 15,279 … … 56.3%
FY2006: ….. 138,244 … … 15,885 … … 11.5% … … 82,965 … … 60.0%
FY2007: ….. 201,987 … ….. 5,573 … ….. 2.8% … … 89,703 ……. 44.4%
FY2012: ….. 245,478 … … 36,588 … … 14.9% … .. 143,448 … … 58.4%
FY2013: ….. 282,774 … ….. 6,654 … ….. 2.4% … .. 154,490 … … 54.6%
FY2014: ….. 304,267 … ….. 4,668 … ….. 1.5% … .. 166,403 … … 54.7%
FY2015:________________________________________________________
TOTAL: …. 3,100,887 … 297,277 … … 9.6% … … 1,471,024 … … 47.4% … (FY1997 to FY2014)
The FY1997 turnover is £27-million and by FY2006, it increases by 500% to £138-million with increase commercial and broadcasting business plus property sales. The successes of the French Spine do contributed to this rapid growth in turnover.
Property development (Highbury Square) contributed substantially to turnover with £316-million in FY2009, and £382-million in FY2010. It was a “one off” never to repeat again.
The 2006/07 move to Emirates Stadium drove the turnover to above £200-million mainly due to the annual £90-million matchday revenues then. Turnover remained flat at around £250-million from FY2007 to FY2012 due to lack of successes on the pitch with broadcasting and commercial businesses not growing at all.
The revenue in retail business grew to £12.1 million (2006 - £10.2 million) boosted by the two new stores on the Emirates Stadium site – The Armoury and All Arsenal – and by increased match attendances. Four years later, retail business seems to peak at £18 million.
In FY2006/07, the Group’s most important commercial contracts are: naming rights and shirt sponsorship contracts with Emirates Airline which expire in 2021 and 2014 respectively, a kit sponsorship contract with Nike which expires in 2011 and a catering contract with Delaware North which expires in 2026. The naming rights deal with Emirates Airline is worth £42 million over the contract term, or a laughable amount of £2.625 million per annum over the 16-seasons contract term. This is one of the primary reasons why even with the Emirates Stadium naming rights and shirt sponsorship, the turnover remained flat during this period.
From FY2013 onward, the turnover jumps from an average £250-million to over £300-million in FY2014. This was mainly due to the new lucrative 3-Year Skysport TV Rights Deal, plus increase in commercial business due to summer tours. When the new Skysport TV Rights Deal start in FY2017, the turnover will easily exceeds £350-million.
The financial contributions during “Arsene Wenger Era” is broadly divided into two parts:
[b]Part 1 - French Football Golden Decade 1990s[/b]
Table 2 is a simple compilation from http://www.transfermarkt.co.uk/jumplist/startseite/verein/11 from 1996/97 to 1999/2000 since financial reports were not available from Arsenal Holdings plc. Arsene Wenger was clearly ahead of his peers and snap-up all those world-class French players at a bargain. It was never to repeat again, none better epitomised by ManU paying £36-million (which may rises to £47-million eventually) for Antony Martial.
“Player Trading” is paid via amortisation. E.g. if a player purchase price is £30-million and he signed a 5-Year Contract, his cost is write-off 30/5 as £6-million per Financial Year for the duration of his Contract.
Arsene Wenger spent £85-million and incurred a loss of (£20-million) from 1996/97 to 1999/00 to buy those French players and others that formed the French Spine who won us three titles.
[b]Table 2: 1996/97 to 1999/00 PLAYER TRADING Turnover in £000’s [/b]
[u] … … ... Player Purchase … Player Sale … Pre-Tax Profit [/u]
FY1997: …… 16,750 … … ..... 6,200 … ….. … -10,550
FY1998: …… . 2,100 … … ..... 2,070 … … … … ... -30
FY1999: …… 20,950 … … ... 23,500 … ….. …... 2,550
FY2000: …… 45,500 … … ... 33,480 … ..... … -12,020
FY2001:________________________________________________________
TOTAL: … … 85,300 … … ... 65,250 … ….. … -20,050
Table 3 is a compilation from Arsenal Holdings Financial Reports during those Emirates Stadium construction “lean years” and paying off those players purchased during French Spine Era:
[b]Table 3: 2000/01 to 2004/05 PLAYER TRADING Turnover in £000’s [/b]
[u] … … ... Player Registration … Player Sale … Pre-Tax Profit [/u]
FY2001: …… -15,145 … … ..... 25,121 … ….. …... 9,976
FY2002: …… -17,681 … … ....... 2,873 … ….. … -14,808
FY2003: …… -18,774 … … ....... 1,370 … ..... … -17,404
FY2004: …… -19,637 … … ....... 2,282 … ..... … -17,355
FY2005: …… -14,993 … … ....... 2,894 … ..... … -12,099
FY2006:________________________________________________________
TOTAL: … … -86,230 … … ..... 34,540 … ….. … -51,690
From 2002/03 onwards, transfer funds were limited and Arsene Wenger was under severe budgetary constraints due to the Emirates Stadium development. Arsene Wenger must sell before he can buy.
Arsene Wenger still incurred a deficit of (£52-million) from 2000/01 to 2004/05, still paying off those French players and others that formed the French Spine which won us three titles. Increasingly, he turned to his Youth Project and sniffed out bargains like Gilberto, Reyes and Lehmann to rebuild Arsenal with Thierry Henry as the FULCRUM. He got lucky with Fabregas, Clichy and Van Persie which formed the backbone of his 2nd Arsenal Team. These are the bargains during 2003 to 2005 when limited funds were made available to buy players.
2002/03: Pascal Cygan, Gilberto Silva. Rami Shaaban, Guillaume Warmuz
2003/04: Lehmann, Jose Reyes, Cesc Fàbregas, Robin van Persie, Clichy, Senderos, Djourou,
2004/05: Manuel Almunia, Mathieu Flamini, Emmanuel Eboué
From 2005/06 to 2013/14, Arsene Wenger was still under financial constraints imposed by the Board; that is, he must sell before he can purchase new players. During this period, Arsene Wenger spent £245-million (Player Registration) and balanced the “Budget” by selling £251-million worth of players.
From 2011/12 onwards, “funds were made available” but the proviso was again, Arsene Wenger must sell before he can buy. Wenger was able to sign Mesut Ozil for £42.5-milion in August 2013 and Alexis Sanchez for £30-milion the next season with the accumulated £26-million “Player Trading” pre-tax profit from 2011/12 plus funds from “Player Sales”.
[b]Table 4: Arsenal Holdings Financial Report – FOOTBALL Group Turnover in £000’s
… … … … … Turnover … ... Pre-Tax Profit … ... … Wage Bill
… … … … … … … …. … … … … ... % of ….. … … … … … ….. % of
[u]… … … … … £'000 … ... ... £'000 … Turnover … ... £'000 ... ….. Turnover [/u]
FY2012: ….. 245,478 … … 36,588 … … 14.9% … .. 143,448 … … 58.4%
FY2013: ….. 282,774 … ….. 6,654 … ….. 2.4% … .. 154,490 … … 54.6%
FY2014: ….. 304,267 … ….. 4,668 … ….. 1.5% … .. 166,403 … … 54.7%
Table 4 (extracted from Table 1 for easy reference) demonstrated clearly that Arsene Wenger was able to sign marquee players from growing turnovers which generated more funds and cash flows. The Board released more funds for Arsene Wenger to sign marquee players like Mesut Ozil and Alexis Sanchez. Again, the Board demanded that Arsene Wenger must balance his Budget.
Even though Fabregas is available at £30-million and keen to return to Arsenal FC, the Board will not allow Arsene Wenger to bust the Budget and drive FY2014 into the red. For example:
Amortisation on Fabregas Transfer based on £30-million and 5-Year Contract paying say £160,000 pw salary:
The slim pre-tax profit for FY2014 will become (4.668 – 14.32) = £9.652-million pre-tax loss!
In August 2015, the only way Arsene Wenger can buy two out of say, this group of Benzema, Draxler, Reus, Schneiderlin, Vidal, et al may be only in August 2016 when the new £5.1-billion Skysport Broadcasting Contract kicks in. Arsene Wenger will then has at least a £100-million Transfer Budget (if the Board allows) to buy two marquee players from unused funds in 2015 and new funds in 2016. It will also need the personality and marquee standing of Arsene Wenger to persuade and convince marquee players to sign for Arsenal FC.
Do we really have the cash flows to buy two marquee players in August 2015?
Table 5 below gives inkling and I can only speculate why the Board refuses to dip into the Cash Reserve to provide Arsene Wenger with a £100-million Transfer Budget in August 2015.
An extract from FY2005/06 Report:
a) Refinancing of debt
“On 25 July 2006 the Group successfully completed a bond issue the proceeds of which have been used to refinance the project finance bank loans (£254.3 million outstanding at 31 May 2006) which the Group had used to fund the development of Emirates Stadium … … with a term of 25 years …”
“£206-million Debt” due after more than one year (bonds) is the remaining Emirates Stadium bond for up to 2031, and other debt, which we are currently redeeming at about £6.7-million per annum.
Total investment in Emirates Stadium and the associated infrastructure amounts to some £430 million.
And Silent Stan owes Arsene Wenger a vote of thanks for managing “Player Trading” and “salary Bill” within Budget so successfully that in less than 10 years, the FY2006 Net Debt was reduced from £262-million to £32-million by FY2014. With the cash hoard continues to accumulate in the bank, Arsenal Holdings plc. should be debt-free by FY2015 or latest by FY2016.
[b]Table 5: Arsenal Holdings Financial Report – Analysis of changes in net debt in £000’s [/b]
… … … … Increase … Cash … … Short Term … Gross ….. Debt Due … Debt Due ... Debenture … Net Debt
[u]… … … … in Cash ….. in Bank … Deposit … ... Cash Flow … < 1 year ….. > 1 year … … … … … … … … …[/u]
FY2006 … (36,031) …… 35,598 … ... ... 0 … … 35,598 … ….. (22,816) … (249,761) … (25,165) … (262,144)
FY2014 ….. 14,640 …… 80,555 .... 127,323 … 207,878 … … … (6,704) … (205,921) … (27,830) ….. (32,577)
FY2015:__________________________________________________________________________________
Negative cash flow is indicated in ( ).
During Arsene Wenger Era from 1996/97 till 2013/14, Arsenal Holdings had accumulative pre-tax profit amount to £297-million, which forms the bulk of that £207-million Cash Reserve. This means Silent Stan is keeping all profits generated and will not spend on player purchases like what Abramovich, Abu Dhabi, Glazer Family and even John Henry are doing to continue building the team to generate successes on the pitch, which will generate more revenues – The Virtuous Cycle. Abramovich and Glazer Family proved the Virtuous Cycle works as both Chelski and ManU generated greater turnover and are self-sustaining profitable business corporation now.
My speculation as to why Silent Stan keeps on retaining all these cash flows every year is:
In summary, Arsene Wenger will continue with his Youth Policy, knowing that the Board will limit his transfer budget. Moreover, he knew he will be out-bidden all the times by Sugar Daddy teams who are willing to pay what it takes to get the players they want.
Or is it Arsene Wenger who is not spending? Guess the truth will only come out after Arsene Wenger Autobiography is published.
